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Introduction 
This paper probes the interaction between human rights and economic development. More 
specifically, it is focused on the influence of sovereign states’ respect for human rights as 
independent variables (IVs) on the domestic economic development, as the dependent variable 
(DVs). This paper regards economic development including economic growth1 related indicators 
to represent development as the outcome. It looks at not only GDP growth rate, but also 
considers other economic indexes in order to have a comprehensive view of the economic 
condition. Thus, this thesis will answer: ‘whether the respect for social and cultural rights by 
countries contributes to domestic economic development?’ The reason for taking such an 
emphasized angle on social and cultural rights and the one-way influence from rights to 
economic development, instead of being vice versa, will be explained in the first chapter. 
The research topic and research question in this paper are inspired by the argument, made by 
Seymour & Pincus (2008), that there is a complementary relationship between human rights in 
general and economics. Specifically, they contend that though human rights studies are more 
normative and the economic studies are more positive in nature, the disparities between them fill 
up each other’s disadvantages and could contribute to the reality. For example, economists, 
especially welfare economists, are consequence-oriented and their arguments are criticized by 
Seymour & Pincus (2008) as unrealistic and lacking moral basis. Thus, the original idea of the 
research topic derives from their works. 
The methodology of this paper is quantitative-based. The author uses panel regression analysis as 
the main analysis tool in research. In order to secure the accuracy of the regression analysis, the 
research targets all UN member states, and excludes observing states such as State of Palestine 
and unrecognized political entities such as Taiwan. The time span of this research is from 1966, 
the birth year of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to 
the current year, 2017. 
 
The panel regression is run on two major parts, which are the de jure database and the de facto 
database. Each database contains two major regressions on the two dependent variables, namely 
                                                          
1 There are differences between economic growth and economic development. The latter covers more 
than economic growth but also elements like life standards.  
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GDP per capita growth rate and Labor productivity. Following that, in each of these regression 
on one specific dependent variable, three models are tested. Therefore, totally forty-eight rounds 
of test, with twenty-four rounds of each database, are implemented in this research paper.   
 
The regression results show that de jure respect and de facto respect for social and cultural rights 
vastly differ from each other, with regard to the effects on the DVs. Specifically speaking, the de 
jure respect for social and cultural rights is more closely correlated to the economic 
development. First, among the twenty-four units of test for each database, ten of them show a 
statistical significance of correlation between the IVs and the DVs in the de jure one while only 
four of them show the significance in the de facto one. Second, as to the four categories of IVs 
per se (Human Rights, Environment, Health, Education & Cultural matters ), the de jure respect 
for human rights category demonstrates a correlation to the DVs in three regression tests while 
there is no correlation between de facto respect for human rights and the DVs; the de jure respect 
for environmental rights shows effects on the DVs with statistical significance in four tests while 
the de facto respect for it only shows half amount of its counterpart;  the de jure respect for 
health rights does not show any correlation with the DVs whereas the de facto respect for it 
displays one significant effect on the DV; three test results demonstrate a correlation between de 
jure respect for education & cultural rights where just one such result is observed in the de facto 
part.  
 
In sum, regardless of the division of the two databases, respect for environmental rights affects 
the changes in economic development most effectively; the respect for education & cultural 
rights the second effective on the DV; and the respect for human rights ranks as the third 
effective one. Respect for health rights casts the least and almost no influence on the economic 
development.  
 
The rest of this paper contains three chapters. The first chapter includes sections of literature 
review and theoretical approach, concepts, and hypotheses. The first section explains the 
academic works that triggered the interest of this paper. It also claims the academic and practical 
importance of this paper. The second section deliberates on the theoretical base supporting the 
foundation of this research and carefully explains the theory developed by the author based on 
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the previous academic works. It also explains the key concepts and the hypotheses of this paper 
based on these theory.  
 
The second chapter contains sections of method & data and results. The first section, namely 
method and data, plays one of the most important role in this research paper, aiming to explain 
the technical issues such as reasons of choosing analysis tools, specific indicators for IVs and 
DVs, coding, models used in regression, etc. The second section, the result part, demonstrates the 
regression results with description and explanation on statistical outcomes of all the regressions.  
 
The third chapter obtains two section, discussion and conclusion. The first one provides three 
parts- the first one with an interpretation of the results, inter alia, the exceptional ones and their 
implications to the research question; the second one with reflections of the test results on the 
theory mentioned in chapter one; the third one with discussion on limitations of this research.  
The second section presents recapitulation on the proposed hypotheses, based on the test results, 
and thoughts and suggestions to further studies in the same realm in the future. 
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Chapter one  
Literature Review 
In their article, Seymour & Pincus (2008) acknowledge that for those who study the relationship 
between human rights and development, including economic development, the analysis of 
human rights is usually focused on political and civil rights.2  Such an argument is supported by 
De Kadt’s (1979), claiming that the first generation of human rights, namely the political and 
civil rights, has been more emphasized by scholars. He argues that the natural characteristic of 
political and civil rights (mainly as negative rights) makes the fulfillment of treaties on such 
rights easier to be achieved by states. In contrast, the second generation of human rights, 
including social and cultural rights, are basically positive rights as an “aspiration of humanity”.3 
De Kadt (1979) implies that for the second generation of human rights there is great leeway for 
states to achieve them according to their limited resources and capacities. Therefore, there have 
been more studies on political and civil rights per se than on the second generation of human 
rights, not to mention the particular realm between human rights and development. In addition, 
O’Brien (1978) makes similar arguments – that not enough attention was given to the socio-
economic rights structure – based on his empirical observations.  
 
Uvin (2002) argues that development practitioners usually ignore human rights.  From his 
justification it shows that he naturally takes it for granted that human rights are supposed to be 
effected by development.4 Besides Uvin (2002), Sykes (2003) also has the same logic issue. He, 
when referring to the relationship between international trade and human rights, unconsciously 
follows the idea that human rights is an output. As a result, his conclusion pointed out that 
trading systems enhance the promotion of human rights. Yet, in his article, he neither considers 
human rights as an explanatory variable, namely an input, nor makes any specification on the 
rights he has analyzed.  
 
                                                          
2 See Seymour & Pincus (2008), pp. 393 
3 See Kadt (1979), pp. 98 
4 See Uvin (2002), pp. 1 
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This paper is designed to argue that first the relationship of influence between human rights and 
development can be inversed that human rights are able to affect economic development. 
Second, making one step further, to explore that to what extent do these rights influence on 
economic development. It also specifies economic development as its dependent variable of the 
research question, instead of development in general; the reason for this is that development per 
se is a broad and vague concept, which can be examined from different perspectives and 
dimensions. Narrowing the scope of research to economic development sets a clearer object that 
can be empirically measured from data that can be gathered relative easily. Although economic 
development cannot represent the whole concept of development studies, this study considered 
economic development as the pivotal component in this research realm.   
 
Slim (2002) concludes that the main argument of Uvin (2002) was criticizing that talks on ‘right-
based development’ are nothing more than a repackaged rhetoric for power intention, which in 
reality is absurd and pointless. He contests such a criticism by arguing that rights-talks could be 
inspiring and genuine. To agree with Slim’s justification for rights-talks, this paper expects to see 
that by testing the research question, it would show a positive effect from human rights, 
specifically social and cultural rights, to economic development. If this expectation is proven 
true, then rights-talks are not “fluff”, as Uvin claimed, since the talks would be justified by the 
fact that ‘rights-based development’ is worth advocating, even though its intentions can be 
manipulated by people. 
 
To sum up, the author realizes there is a research vacuum regarding the relationship between 
development and social and cultural rights. The research question considers only the analysis of 
the second generation of social and cultural rights, doing so in order to fill some of the vacuum, 
and thus, justifying the academic significance of this thesis. 
 
Besides its importance, this paper also possesses significance to the real world. Welling (2008) 
claims that objective international indicators would help sovereign states to improve their 
implementation of the ICESCR. This research holds the same advantages, since its outcomes are 
expected to verify the expected positive influence from the respect for social and cultural rights 
to economic development, as well as to point out specific rights that have certain effects on 
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improving economic developments. The author expects the research results to provide a 
legitimate basis and motivation for states to accomplish their commitment to the fulfillment of 
social and cultural rights. In addition, by referring to this research in the future, states would 
have a clearer direction towards achieving their goal of improving social and cultural rights, as 
well as economic development.  
 
Theoretical Approach, Concepts, and Hypotheses  
Theoretical approach and concepts 
As the two main subjects of this research are social and cultural rights (representing human 
rights) and economic development, the most matching theoretical framework is thus the rights-
based approaches [to development studies], or say the rights-based development. Though titles of 
such a framework vary sometimes, they mainly target the same goal of involving human rights 
into the development studies. The rights-based approach or rights-based development is a type of 
method to study development, with special focus on the relation between human rights and 
development. As Ensor et al. (2015) states, the rights-based approaches incorporate and place the 
concern of human rights at the center of the development.5 Jones (2005) points out that rights-
based development approaches are beyond the mere reading of legal documents, but also require 
the social action based on political interpretation.6 The logic of thinking about rights-based 
development approaches is not only normative prescription from relevant law, but also reflects 
“power relations and rights claims” that certain law on the duty of states could be referred to.7 
(Ensor et al. 2015; Piron 2005; Uvin; 2004)  Based on the logic of Jones (2005), the rights-based 
approaches are complementary with the legal basis for the concept of human rights in this paper, 
which will be explained in the conceptualization section. While the legal basis, such as treaties 
on human rights like ICESCR, secures the legitimacy and legality of exploring the respect for 
human rights as an input on the effects of economic development in this paper, the rights-based 
approaches help to clarify that governments are the main actor to fulfill rights since they bear the 
duties according to the discussion above.  
                                                          
5 See Ensor et al. (2015), pp. 39 
6 See Ensor et al. (2015), pp. 40 
7 Ibid.  
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Although such terms as rights-based approaches have only been existing for a few decades, 
mainly after the breakdown of the Cold War, the development of such a theoretical approach in 
academia has since been booming. Kindornay et al. (2012) illustrates a boom of academic works 
on the study of rights-based approaches to development from 1999 to 2008 by calculating the 
amount of work published in this field. In reality, multiple development actors have also 
incorporated such a theoretical frame work into their agenda and works. (Kindornay et al. 2012; 
Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi 2004) These actors range from the most devout believers of 
human rights-based approaches as a normative principles such as UNICEF8 and UNDP,9 to the 
World Bank, some of which’s projects are more profit-oriented, based on the rights-based 
approach.10 
 
By adopting the rights-based approaches to development, this paper sees the involvement of 
human rights to measure development being justified due to both normative and pragmatic 
reasons, which are shortly explained below.11 First, Hausermann (1998) acknowledges that the 
unique feature of rights-based approaches can be found in its strong normative basis for rights 
buttressed by international law in the pursuit for development. It is also the moral and legal basis 
of the research question here to take the respect for human rights as an input. If such a normative 
basis is not secured, the research question would not be legitimate, as the necessity for discussing 
human rights in development would be weakened. Second, as Ferguson (1999) points out, 
introducing human rights in the discourse on development is a tool to increase countries’ 
accountability to citizens. Following his logic, this paper considered that accountability 
contributes to the protection and promotion of human rights, thus influencing the development of 
countries. 
 
                                                          
8 The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
9 United Nations Development Program  
10 For example, the water partnership programs to developing countries cooperated by the World Bank 
and Netherlands. See Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi (2004), pp. 1427 
11 There are three categories of justification for talking about rights in development. They are normative, 
pragmatic, and ethical. See Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi (2004), pp. 1416 
10 
 
Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi (2004) discusses four dimensions of the role of human rights in 
rights-based approaches.12 It seems that the social and cultural rights in the research question 
here accord with two dimensions of the role among them. First, they provide “normative 
principles” for countries in the realization of their development. For example, they indicate 
realms such as education and public health that countries could plan and implement relevant 
development projects. Second, these rights per se function as criteria for evaluating the 
implementation of development. Here, these rights are not simply setting goals for development, 
but rather working as measures for examining development.  
 
Sen (1999) argues for the importance of not merely focusing on wealth and economic 
performance indicators when looking at the concept of development, as well as emphasizing the 
significant role of freedom, which includes various dimensional determinants. Among them, 
determinants such as “conditions of basic education”13, health care,  are within the coverage of 
social and cultural rights in this thesis. The arguments of Sen (1999) indirectly justify the 
importance and necessity of utilizing the rights-based approaches to development as the 
theoretical framework.    
 
Hypotheses 
Knack & Keefer (1997) probes the effect from social capital to economic performance. They 
borrow the definition of social capital from Coleman (1990) and Loury (1977), to qualify that 
trust and norms of civic cooperation (NCC) are the manifestations of social capital. They 
discovers that higher levels of both trust and norms of civic cooperation contribute to better 
economic performance.14 In other words, there is a positive influence from these two 
manifestations of social capital upon economic performance. By examining the determinants of 
trust and norms of civic cooperation, Knack & Keefer (1997) then declare that “low social 
polarization and formal institutional rules”15 help build trust and norms of civic cooperation. 
Following this logic, low social polarization and formal institutional rules partly contribute to 
economic performance. Fukuyama (1995) makes similar arguments when asserting that high-
                                                          
12 See Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi (2004), pp. 1431.  
13 See Sen, A. (1999), pp. 5 
14 See Knack & Keefer (1997), pp. 1252-1254.  
15 Only formal institutional rules that constrain authorities.  
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level of trust links to economic efficiency, since the transaction costs, such as financial cost and 
time cost, are vastly reduced.16 He also points out that institutions are necessary for the societal 
prosperity of increased trust, as such trust denotes to the relations between public institutions and 
civil societies. Sen (1999) states that transparency guarantees, as one type of “instrumental 
freedom”, can help build up the degree of trust within the society and can also reinforce other 
types of  “instrumental freedom” including social opportunities.17 This argument implied a 
connection between trust and freedoms, namely that the latter might contribute to the former.  
Summarizing the logic of the above argument, there is a potentially indirect impact from 
freedom to economic development appearing. According to Sen (1999), freedom, especially 
social opportunity, obtains social and cultural rights, such as education, health, living standard in 
general18. This paper thus proposes an indirect impact of social and cultural rights on the 
economic development and prosperity.  
Since the birth of ICESCR, several international human rights treaties have been designed to 
protect and promote social and cultural rights of people and to advocate against social inequality 
which leads to social polarization. For example, as the wording of ICESCR reads: “to ensure the 
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights…”19, 
“without discrimination of any kind as to race, color, sex…”20, the establishment of treaties 
covering the protection and promotion of social and cultural rights and the enforcement of such 
implementation also function to eliminate social polarization and set up formal institutional 
rules. 
The Productivity of Nations (1996) claims that elements such as schooling are important, as a 
contribution to human capital, and higher contribution to human capital gave results of higher 
output per worker. These social and cultural elements, which indirectly contribute to the output 
per worker, are defined as rights and are promoted by ICESCR and other international human 
rights treaties. 
                                                          
16 See Fukuyama (1995), pp. 151.  
17 See Sen (1999), pp.39 
18 Ibid.  
19 See Art. 3, ICESCR 
20 See Art. 2, ICESCR 
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Based on arguments in the literature review and the theoretical framework and concepts part of 
this section, human rights, with rare focus on social and cultural rights, could cast influence on 
the development and government is seen as the main player. The discussion above then indicates 
an indirect influence, through several elements, from social and cultural rights upon the 
economic development. Combining them all together, this paper develops a logic line of the 
impact process and it is illustrated below: 
 
This graph implies that this paper reckons social and cultural rights of countries based on 
international law can affect economic development some elements existing in societies and 
institutions.  
To clarify, the interest of this paper only rests on the impact of these two types of rights on the 
economic development while the elements in between are beyond the scope of this paper and are 
illustrated to clarify the logic reasoning of the hypotheses only.  
Thus, based on the above discussion, this paper proposes the following hypotheses:  
H1: The higher degree a country’s respect for social and cultural rights, the better its economic 
development will be.  
Economic 
Development
/ Prosperity
Social 
Capital
NCC
Trust Freedom
Social 
Rights
Cultural 
Rights
Country's 
Respect/Action
Internationa
l Law
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Yet, Hardin (1992) points out that trust works only with “strong government to enforce 
contracts”. That said, when countries sign treaties to protect and promote rights without ratifying 
and/or implemented such treaties, the degree of trust would vary, resulting in differing levels of 
economic performance.  
Based on that:  
H2: The de facto respect for social and cultural rights and the de jure respect for social and 
cultural rights differently contribute to economic development. 
In the next chapter, practical issues pertinent to the methods, data, and the operation on the test 
will be discussed step by step. First, considerations on methods selection are presented. Second, 
the process of conceptualization on key idea and variables of the research is provided before the 
data processing stage. Following is the explanation on detailed data management and data 
handling. Third, the result part will comprehensive description of the test result of each round of 
regression, accompanied with graphic illustration of the outcomes.  
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Chapter Two 
Method and Data 
Introduction   
This paper approaches the research topic through quantitative methods with the use of Stata. The 
use of quantitative approach instead of qualitative is based on two reasons. First, the number of 
observed subjects; as the research question implies, the use of phrases country’s respect indicates 
that countries in general is the population. And the amount of countries existing in the 
international community is large enough to resort to quantitative approaches. Moreover, based on 
the population and potential sample size, it would be difficult to exert qualitative measures, such 
as case study, small N comparisons, etc. As qualitative methods require developing deep 
understandings of the phenomenon studied, the enormous energy and time needed apparently are 
beyond the author’s capability to apply to the large number of research subjects in this study. By 
comparison, quantitative methods are good at processing large amount of data with the assistance 
of statistical techniques. Second, the essence of the research question is more suitable to 
quantitative method than qualitative method. The research question in this thesis enquires, in 
essence, a confirmation or denial on the existence of relationships between IVs and DVs. The 
results should, to some extent, be able to generalize to the majority, if not all, of the population. 
Ben-Eliyahu (2014) states that observing the “overall pattern” is the advantage of quantitative 
methods21, which matches the core interests of this research. Qualitative methods, on the other 
hand, are better at providing more accurate analyses, especially on exceptions overlooked by 
quantitative methods, of single and small sample size cases. Yet, due to the limited amount of 
cases that could be analyzed by research, the generalization competence of them is weaker than 
the quantitative ones. Thus, it does not fit the subject of this research, which denotes to countries 
in a general sense, instead of within pooled categories.  
Use of panel regression analysis  
Panel regression is utilized to analyze the data among all quantitative research methods. This 
technique, in essence, is a type of linear regression that is run on the cross-sectional time-series 
variables.22 It is an ideal tool for researches that contain a fixed number of subjects, such as 
                                                          
21 See Rhodes, J. (2014) 
22 See Williams, R. (2015). 
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country, company, organization, etc. within a time period. It also has an advantage to analyze 
variables that are hard to measure, like cultural factors.23 As explained earlier, the ICESCR 
serves as the legal base for the hypotheses in this paper. Thus, there was a time period considered 
in this research, starting from the birth of this treaty till now. In this case, panel regression is an 
ideal model for the test. The formula of basic panel regression model is showed below: 
yit=µt+βxit+ct+αi+εit24 
Note : yit denotes economic development; xit devotes to respect for social and cultural rights; ct 
indicates time effects, αi means country fixed effects. 
It can be seen from the formula that the concerns on both time dimension and cross-section 
dimension are applied to explanatory element x and the output y.   
Stata 13 is chosen as the tool to perform panel regression analysis. This is a professional 
statistics package that can be used to run regular regression analysis and is commonly used by 
social scientists. It is combined with the use of Excel. More specifically, Excel works as a data 
management tool and Stata as the data analysis tool in this research.  
Conceptualization on the variables  
Different people will have different definitions of social and cultural rights. To clarify, this paper 
relies on the ICESCR as its legal basis and provision for the coverage of social and cultural 
rights. The logic to set up both legal basis and conceptual basis is that “[m]onitoring necessitates 
a conceptual framework to define what to monitor before one can proceed to discuss how and 
move to de design of indicators”. (Tomasevski 2001; Welling 2008) Utilizing the same logic for 
this paper works for two reasons. First, since human rights, especially social and cultural rights, 
are the core independent variables in this research, this paper needs a legal basis to solidify the 
legitimacy of its arguments on human rights. The ICESCR satisfies both the legitimacy and 
legality of these arguments. Second, it paves the way for the operationalization of the 
quantitative analysis in this paper by indicating the specific rights or group of rights that this 
research should consider. Therefore human rights in this thesis refers to the rights provided by 
the ICESCR as a framework. This paper takes Sieghart (1983)’ opinion on rights covered by 
                                                          
23 See Torres-Reyna, O. (2007). 
24 Ibid.  
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ICESCR, which it deems all the rights in this treaty as positive rights, compared to political and 
civil rights category that belongs to negative rights. In a nutshell, positive rights are rights that 
are conditional on other persons or group actions, which in this research mainly refers to the 
actions of the government. Definitions of human rights in this research also fits the legal branch 
of human rights theory.25 Based on this theoretical foundation, this paper believes rights covered 
in it will only be understood when they are read in the context of law. Some rights do not fit into 
this criterion, causing the number of rights covered by this research paper to decrease. However, 
the paper would retain the legal basis to defend these rights and judge the performance of 
governments. 
Operationalization 
One important part of the research question in this paper is the respect for human rights, 
particularly social and cultural rights. As the range and base of human rights has been explained 
in the last section, this section is dedicated to explain the way the concept ‘respect’ is 
operationalized.  
Saris & Gallhofer (2004), though mainly addressing the operationalization of concepts in surveys 
and questionnaires, sheds light on the author’s thinking of operationalization in this paper. Saris 
& Gallhofer (2004) proposes two different types of concepts: concepts by intuition and concepts 
by postulation. The former includes concepts containing secular meaning that can be understood 
easily, while the latter consists of concepts that are more difficult to comprehend due to the 
complexity, such as multi-layered concepts from the first type.26 In one example, they 
categorized an “attitude towards Clinton”27 as a concept by postulation and then declared attitude 
as a concept by postulation. This gives the inspiration of the way to operationalize respect. This 
paper intends to objectify ‘respect for human rights’ as “attitude towards human rights”. 
Combined with the early discussion on the base of human rights, the thoughts on 
operationalization then are developed into “attitude towards legal basis of social and cultural 
rights, namely the international treaties of such rights”. Thinking of international treaties on 
rights as objects, it is easier to link countries’ signatures and ratifications as the measure of their 
                                                          
25 There are two branches consisted by the human rights theory, which are ethical and philosophical 
branch and the legal branch. See Seymour & Pincus (2008), pp. 389. 
26 See Saris & Gallhofer (2004), pp. 236 
27 See Saris & Gallhofer (2004), pp. 237 
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willingness to accept and recognize these rights. As ‘willing to’ here is an obvious representation 
of attitude, in the end of the operationalization process, the signatures and ratifications are 
chosen and justified as the measurable form of ‘respect for human rights’.  
Yet, this operationalization result only reflects the nominal side of the respect for human rights, 
namely the de jure dimension. Armaline et al. (2016) asserts the necessity of considering both 
the de jure and the de facto dimension when studying human rights. They argue that it is critical 
to approach human rights from the de jure perspective since it provides guidance on the 
definition, essence, etc. of rights. Nevertheless, commitment to de jure human rights does not 
secure the practical implementation and effects of human rights. Thus, it is imperative to assess 
the respect to human rights in the de facto dimension as well.  
The operationalization of the de facto respect to human rights is more straightforward than that 
of de jure. First, other than relying on written documents or oral commitments, the indicators 
measured should be practical materials. Among them, statistic outcomes are the most common 
and accessible choices. Second, to combine this with the research question, in which the respect 
for human rights is treated as a predictable variable, the statistical outcomes reflect the input, not 
output, of human rights. Therefore, statistical outcomes related to contributions for human rights 
is the de facto way to examine the respect of human rights in this paper.  
Population and Sampling Procedure  
It is obvious to see from the research question that the sample of this paper includes all countries 
in the international community. In the case of this paper, the UN member states, excluding 
commonly unrecognized political entities and partially recognized states, are selected as the 
sample. The logic of doing so derives from the constitutive theory of recognition, instead of the 
declaratory theory. The constitutive theory, summarily, contends that the key qualification for 
countries to have an international personality as sovereign states is to be recognized by other 
states, while declaratory theory argues that it is up to the claiming states. Both theories hold pros 
and cons in terms of explaining the real-world practice and implications for the future.28 There 
are no agreements yet in either academia or professional sector in regard to the absolute 
                                                          
28 See Worster (2009),pp. 120 (international law) 
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dominance of these two theories. The decision made in this paper to adopt the constitutive theory 
of statehood is based on its theoretical advantages and practical convenience.  
As to the theoretical advantage, the explanatory variables in this paper are partly based on 
countiries’ signing and ratification of the international treaties. Such actions imply the use of 
sovereign rights of states, and mostly these rights are exerted by generally recognized countries. 
Compared to the declaratory theory, the constitutive theory has the upper hand when reflecting 
the state practice of such rights granted through the recognition of the international community.29 
Worter (2009) argues that constitutive theory works substantially while the declaratory theory 
works formally.30 Thus, regarding the very essence of the present research question, the 
constitutive theory of statehood serves better to this research than the other in terms of sampling.  
As for the practical convenience, the main logic for sampling only UN member states is based on 
the accessibility and comprehensiveness of valid data. There are a few reasons some non-
member states and/or unrecognized political entities, reliable data might not be collected. First, 
as elaborated earlier, this thesis probes states’ de jure respect for human rights, where it refers to 
international treaties. Yet, for political entities like Taiwan, which do not have the international 
legal personality to sign a UN treaty, their respect for human rights will difficult to measure. 
Second, for some non-member states, the UN might not be able to provide data for all indicators. 
Third, both the capability of signing and ratifying international treaties and the economic 
development in some commonly unrecognized states, like the State of Palestine, could be heavily 
affected and manipulated other external factors that may or may not change with the passage of 
time. Therefore, this paper considers these political entities lack not only legitimacy, but also the 
full capacity to function as a sovereign government, and thus excludes them from the analysis, 
even when relevant data could be accessed. 
Data Collection  
This section will explain the collection of data for both IVs and DVs. The first section will 
explain the data collected for IVs, distinguishing between the de jure and the de facto parts. The 
second section will discuss the collection of data for DVs. Most data comes from primary 
                                                          
29 See Woster (2009); Caplan (2005) 
30 See Woster (2009), pp. 133 
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sources, in order to maximally secure the reliability of the data per se and to qualify the 
outcomes of the regressions as proper results. 
De jure IVs  
Data for the de jure IVs comes from UN Treaty Collection.  Specifically speaking, the Status of 
Treaties section under the UN Treaty Collection provides updated information on the condition 
(signature, ratification, withdrawal, etc.) of all UN treaties. These treaties are organized into 
different chapters based on their categories. The main contributors of data regarding de jure IVs 
are the Chapter of Human Rights, Chapter of Health, Chapter of Educational & Cultural Matters, 
and Chapter of Environment. The reasoning behind such selection process is that these four 
categories cover the main areas of social and cultural rights under the framework of ICESCR. 
Specifically speaking, this paper picks up eight treaties under the chapter of Human Rights 
(representing both social and cultural rights), nine treaties from the chapter of Environment 
(representing social rights), three treaties from the chapter of Health (representing social rights), 
and six treaties from the chapter of Education & Cultural Matters(representing cultural rights). 
Treaties in the Human Rights chapter are not mere social and cultural rights treaties, due to their 
generality. For example, treaties such as ICESCR, CEDAW31, CRC32, etc. are either 
comprehensive or social identity-oriented treaties. That said, they cover more than mere social 
and cultural rights; they also cover economic, political, and civil rights. The following is the 
illustration of all treaties used for the de jure variables. 
    
 
 
Human Rights Environment  Health Education & Cultural 
Matters 
International Covenant 
on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 
United Nations 
Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 
Agreement on the 
establishment of the 
International Vaccine 
Institute 
Convention for the 
Protection of Producers 
of Phonograms against 
Unauthorized 
Duplication of their 
Phonograms 
                                                          
31 The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
32 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
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Optional Protocol to 
the International 
Covenant on 
Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations 
Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 
WHO Framework 
Convention on 
Tobacco Control 
Protocol to the 
Agreement on the 
Importation of 
Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Materials 
of 22 November 1950 
Convention on the 
Elimination of All 
Forms of 
Discrimination against 
Women 
Amendment to Annex 
B of the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate 
Change 
Protocol to Eliminate 
Illicit Trade in Tobacco 
Products 
International 
Agreement for the 
Establishment of the 
University for Peace 
Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the 
Elimination of All 
Forms of 
Discrimination against 
Women 
Doha Amendment to 
the Kyoto Protocol 
 Statutes of the 
International Centre for 
Genetic Engineering 
and Biotechnology 
Convention on the 
Rights of the Child 
Paris Agreement  Protocol of the 
Reconvened 
Plenipotentiary 
Meeting on the 
Establishment of the 
International Centre for 
Genetic Engineering 
and Biotechnology 
Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of 
children in armed 
conflict 
Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
 Amendments to 
Articles 6 (6) and 7 (1) 
of the Statutes of the 
International Centre for 
Genetic Engineering 
and Biotechnology 
Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the 
Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
  
International 
Convention against 
Apartheid in Sports 
Nagoya - Kuala 
Lumpur Supplementary 
Protocol on Liability 
and Redress to the 
Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety 
  
 Nagoya - Kuala 
Lumpur Supplementary 
Protocol on Liability 
and Redress to the 
Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety 
  
 
21 
 
Each treaty is chosen because it reflects one area/topic under the relevant treaty category that is 
emphasized by the ICESCR. For instance, one reason that education & cultural matters treaty 
group represents cultural rights based on ICESCR is because it is relevant to the area of 
advocating for “minimum education standards” claimed by Art. 13 ICESCR. And the selection 
of Protocol to the Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Materials of 22 November 1950 as one of the indicators under this treaty category reflects such a 
particular emphasis.  
There are two types of potential issues from the selected treaties in the Human Rights chapter 
that might cause imprecise estimate on the test results. First, the wider range of ICESCR 
containing elements adulterating respect for economic rights with respect for social and cultural 
rights into the test. This might be problematic because there could be endogenous processes 
occurring between the IVs with elements of economic rights and DVs, namely economic 
development. The logic is simple to be understood. Taking the promotion of right to form and 
join trade union as an example33: more respect for such a right might leads to a faster economic 
development, such as GDP growth caused by higher volume of trade. As a result, the enlarged 
economy might in return request greater respect for such an economic right. This paper 
acknowledges the possibility of the endogenous process between part of the de jure IVs and the 
DVs and the impossibility of deleting the ICESCR from the analysis because of its role as the 
theoretical base.  
Second, the inclusion of elements of respect for political and civil rights in all treaties under the 
Human Rights chapter. There are treaties protecting and promoting the rights of women, 
children, and the disabled, included in the regression test in this paper. These treaties, except 
social and cultural rights, advocate also economic, political, and civil rights. Thus, elements of 
such rights could also be mixed into the analysis and could make the result deviated. However, 
they are still selected based on the understanding of the ICESCR. The ICESCR emphasizes the 
protection of rights for women, mothers, and children in several articles.34 By particularly 
looking at the entitlement of rights to these groups, the treaty implies that they are vulnerable 
groups in society that need special attention. The same situation also applies to disabled and 
                                                          
33 This right is claimed by Art. 8 ICESCR 
34 Art. 3,7, 10(2) ICESCR mentioned the rights of women and mothers; Art. 10 (1)(3), 13(3) discussed the 
rights entitled to children.  
22 
 
racial-minority groups, but in a more implicit way. The use of words everyone in Art. 6-13 
ICESCR implies the entitlement of equal rights for the disabled, implicitly. In practice, the 
emergence of various treaties for these vulnerable social groups reflect such implications from 
ICESCR. Thus, it is necessary to include these treaties, since they together reflect the enormous 
deliberation on social and cultural rights, in spite of attentions to other rights at the same time.  
The problems mentioned above are not unconquerable, at least to some extent. They can be 
improved by the creation and annexation of treaties from the other three chapters of the UN 
Treaty Collection as part of the de jure IVs, since they do not contain elements of economic 
rights and can be tested as independent categories respectively. Moreover, the regression tests 
between the de facto IVs and DVs also ameliorate issues here by producing results with no other 
elements, like respect for political and civil rights, involved.  
In general, the argument in favor of choosing potentially problematic treatises is that they more 
or less contain various rights, together accounting to a large representation of social and cultural 
rights. Therefore, it is still fair to test states’ de jure respect for social and cultural rights, because 
when they sign and/or ratify them, these two rights are in their consideration. This paper also 
looks at the signature and/or ratification of the optional protocols of certain treaties because the 
optional protocols usually receive much less signature and ratification.  Thus, states’ 
commitment to specific human rights will be better represented in their acceptance of such 
protocols. 
The top criteria of selecting specific treaties under each chapter is to which extent does a treaty 
represent the chapter it belongs to in relatively more comprehensive way and represent the rights 
claimed by the ICESCR in relatively more complete way? For instance, there are seventeen 
different treaties in the Environment chapter; most of them have at least one protocol, some have 
up to twelve protocols. To include all of them is not only unnecessary and time-consuming, but 
also contains high risk of adding elements beyond the research scope into the analysis. For 
instance, the Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltics, North East 
Atlantic, Irish and North Seas is relevant to environmental rights, it limits the scope of its state 
parties geographically. Therefore, it cannot be used by this study. The exclusive nature of this 
treaty would lead to a more deviated result if being taken into consideration. In addition, the 
focus of this treaty is too narrow to represent the rights emphasized by the ICESCR. Ignorance 
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on such treaties is made up by selecting more general treaties that obtain a wider radiation on 
both regions and types of rights . For instance, by selecting the Convention on Biological 
Diversity as one of the representatives of the environment chapter, the agreement to protect 
cetaceans is automatically included.  
Another important criterion for choosing the proper treaties for this study is the year of a treaty’s 
birth. Since the major source of legal base for this research is the ICESCR, all observations, 
whether de jure or de facto, need to come after the birth year of the ICESCR, namely 1966. Thus, 
for the selection of treaties, those born before 1966 are not considered. Otherwise, the results, 
even if they could test the hypotheses proposed here, would not be supported by the theoretical 
framework. The Constitution of the World Health Organization, for example, although listed 
within the Health chapter and highly relevant to social and cultural rights, is not selected because 
it was born in 1946 and so falls beyond this paper’s research scope.  
De facto IVs 
To facilitate the regressions and the comparability of the results, the de facto IVs are selected 
according to the form of de jure IVs, so that data only relevant to the four categories of rights is 
considered35. The data selection of de facto IVs comes from two sources: the World Bank data 
catalog and the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project. Specifically speaking, 
data for the human rights category is collected from CIRI data project, while data for the other 
three groups is from the World Bank data catalog. Since the raw data is richer and the fluctuation 
of the indicators is more obvious in the de facto part, only a few indicators are picked in each 
category, with two for Human Rights, one for Environment, one for Health, and two for 
Education & Cultural Matters.36 Indicators of the latter three categories are drawn intentionally 
from the correspondently classified categories in the World Bank data catalog, for the purpose of 
securing substantial relevance to social and cultural rights based on ICESCR and circumventing 
endogenous effects between IVs and DVs. For example, CO2 emission metric per capita is 
chosen to represent the environment category because it is highly connected to the claim for such 
rights by the ICESCR in terms of the wording “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
                                                          
35 To clarify, these four categories are Human Rights, Environment, Health, and Education & Cultural 
Matters.  
36 The indicators to the de facto IVs are the same as the treaties to the de jure IVs.  
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living …improvement of living conditions”37 and to the environmental treaties, which represent 
social rights since they also aim to improve the living standard of people, are picked for de jure 
IVs. Governmental expenditure on education of GDP, as an indicator of the Education & 
Cultural Matters category, which seemingly might have endogenous correlation with the 
economic performance, does not arouse reverse effects necessarily. The argument here is that 
better economic development does not assume more investment in the education sector; needless 
to say, education and human rights generally belong to so-called low politics, which implies that 
they possess the lower priority than high politics, such as the security affairs. The key motivation 
for countries to invest in their education might relies on the potential economic benefits, but not 
as a necessary result of a current prosperous economy. In other words, the respect for social and 
cultural rights predominate the decisions of budget distribution. 
Due to the scarcity of data from the World Bank data catalog on human rights indicators, CIRI 
data project is considered. However, the credibility of this source has been checked before the 
extraction of data. In essence, this data project is a database that provides ratings of countries, 
within a certain time period, based on their practical performance on respecting human rights. 
The database relies mainly on the US State Department Country Reports as its primary source, 
supplemented by secondary sources like Amnesty International.38 Yet, since the picked 
indicators are not based on this secondary source, it’s credibility is beyond the scope of 
discussion in this paper. Two indicators, Worker Rights and Women’s Social Rights, are selected 
from this database to measure the practical respect of countries for social and cultural rights. 
Both indicators are chosen based on their strong relevance to the essence of the social and 
cultural rights emphasized by the ICESCR, although there is no information provided to explain 
their theoretical base. Another reason is that both indicators consist of assessment on several 
particular rights embedded in the ICESCR. The former one, Worker Rights, includes appraisal on 
the rights claimed by Art. 6, 7, 8, 10(3) ICESCR as well as CRC, whereas the latter one, 
Women’s Social Rights, incorporates evaluation on the rights covered by not only the ICESCR, 
but also CEDAW. The biggest advantage of these two indicators is that they exclusively cover 
social and cultural rights.  
                                                          
37 See art. 11(1) ICESCR 
38 See Cingranelli et al. (2014), pp. 3. 
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DVs 
Data for DVs are extracted from two different sources, with the GDP per capita from the World 
Bank data catalog and the Labor productivity per person (LP) from the Total Economic Database 
(TED) provided by The Conference Board39. Since the TED is a secondary database, the primary 
source contributing to the LP will be explained in detail. 
The expression of Labor productivity is listed below: 
𝑦=𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝐿40 
 Note: y represents the LP as output from the division of Labor employed (L) by total 
GDP. 
As different indicators are based on numerous primary sources in TED, only sources of GDP and 
Labor are considered as sources for the LP, in line with the expression above. According to the 
TED: Source and Method, the composition of primary sources for GDP and Employment is 
extraordinarily complicated, since the available sources vary in each region, or even in each 
country and in each year. For instance, the source of the Real GDP of Algeria before 1990 is 
from the Maddison Project, while that after 1990 comes from International Data Base (IDB) of 
the US Census Bureau. As to the employed population of this country, the main sources before 
1988 is the International Labor Organization (ILO) Official Estimates, while after 1988 they are 
retrieved from Have Analytics, until 2014, when the source again changes back to ILO Key 
Indicators of Labor Market.41 Despite the complexity of the raw sources used by TED, due to the 
lack of systematically available data, TED is the only choice, needless to say the primary sources 
it relied are reputable organizations, which to some extent the credibility of the data was secured.   
Data Preparation 
Data is prepared for official regression tests in two phases, with the first being building a 
database in Excel and the second containing variable adjustments in Stata. In the first phase, two 
separate databases are built up. The first one (de jure database) includes data of the de jure IVs 
and DVs and the second one (de facto database) contains the de facto IVs and DVs. The use of 
                                                          
39 The Conference Board is an organization of business membership and research in public interest. It is 
based in New York City and has offices spread in Canada, Europe, and Asia. Foe detail, see 
https://www.conference-board.org/about/index.cfm?id=1980 
40 See De Vries, K. & Erumban, A. A. (2016), pp. 14 for the sake of consistency.  
41 For more detail, see The Conference Board. (2017) Output, Labor, and Labor Productivity 1950-2017. 
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panel regression implies that the formation of the database should be in an order that displays 
both the cross-section (country) dimension and the time-series (year) dimension. Thus, when 
building up both databases in Excel, the name of the countries and years are listed in the first two 
columns in order, and the name of IVs and DVs are placed in the top rows.  
In the first phase, namely database building, raw data redrived for de jure IVs needs to be coded 
and is impossible to be directly placed into the de jure database.  Data of countries’ signature and 
ratification conditions of treaties is coded into ordinal variables in the form of 0, 0.5, and 1. The 
numbers are given in order from the lowest level of respecting for social and cultural rights to the 
highest level. Specifically speaking, value 0 is given to countries that have not signed a specific 
treaty; value 0.5 is given to those which have signed but not ratified; value 1 is given to those 
which have signed and ratified. This procedure applies to data of all four treaty categories in the 
de jure part. All other data, de facto IVs and the DVs, after being retrieved from sources, are 
placed in the regular order mentioned above for panel regression and do not need to be coded at 
this stage.  
The data collection section above mentions that treaties in the Human Rights category include 
respect for rights other than social and cultural rights, and that this situation would result more 
deviated outcomes; it also provides logical arguments why these treaties are still selected. In this 
section, it is argued that from the technical perspective it is also not possible to peel political, 
civil, and economic rights elements out of the social and cultural rights ones, since there is no 
clear separation of articles regarding different categories of rights.   
In the second phase, namely variable adjusting in Stata, some changes are made on a few 
variables. First, for both de jure and de facto databases, the coded indicators under each treaty 
category are grouped together as a unified new variable to represent each category and the new 
category contains averaged value from all original indicators. For instance, indicators reflecting 
respects for the eight treaties under the Human Rights category are grouped and averaged as one 
IV named Human Rights, via the command -generate new Var = (sum of old Vars)/ #of old Vars. 
There are four final IVs run by the regression, with the names Human Rights, Environment, 
Health, and Education & Cultural Matters. Reasons to do so slightly differed for each database.  
As for the de facto part, the reason to grouping indicators under one category is for the sake of 
generality of the results. Since this paper tests the influence of social and cultural rights in 
27 
 
general on economic development, these two categories of rights are expected to have a certain 
degree of coverage capability. Thus, it is better to group indicators with disparate focuses under 
the same category in the regression. Otherwise, even a single IV would be statistically significant 
on its impact to the DVs; and such a result could not be interpreted to represent a whole 
category, nor, needless to say, social or cultural rights as general concepts.  
As for the de jure part, besides the point argued above, here is one more reason concerned: The 
fluctuation of de jure variables is comparatively subtle, and therefore, the effect of significance 
of variables representing each single treaty is limited. Once a country signs a treaty, through the 
whole testing period, there would be only two values, namely 0 and 0.5. Even when the most 
fluctuating condition happened, the total frequency of change would be merely twice.42 By 
grouping these single indicators together in the order of each treaty category, the fluctuation of 
IVs was expected to be more obvious and the contribution to the DVs would be easier to detect. 
The variable GDP per capita is altered to GDP per capita growth rate as one of the final versions 
of DVs. Simply speaking, the GDP per capita reflects the living standard of people in a country, 
while the GDP per capita growth rate tells how fast and  broadly to which direction the national 
economy is heading. Below are the basic calculation formulas of both economic indexes. 
R / C = real GDP per capita43 
(GDP per capitat+1-GDP per capitat)/GDP per capitat= GDP per capita growth rate 
Notes: R denotes to the annual GDP44 and C denotes to the population of a country. 
There are two reasons to choose GDP per capita growth rate instead of GDP per capita as a DV. 
First, the GDP per capita growth rate tells the trend of economic performance as well as the 
living standard, while the GDP per capita does not reflect the later characteristic and the 
tendency of the big picture. Second, as the formula shows, GDP per capita heavily relies on the 
population. Here, the word population denotes the population size, consisting of citizens, of 
                                                          
42 From value 0 to 0.5 and from value 0.5 to 1.  
43 See Amadeo (2017) 
44 The discussion of using real GDP or nominal GDP is irrelevant of the research topic of this paper 
although they give rise to different statistics result due to technical issues. The argument to defend their 
irrelevance with this paper is that GDP growth rate focuses on the tendency of change. Therefore, no 
matter whether inflation is included or not, the tendency keeps the same.  
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countries, instead of the technical concept used in statistics. Population could be problematic, 
since it is not closely relevant to either the respect for social and cultural rights or the mere 
economic performance. Population change is expected to usually be small in magnitude over 
time, and this stability therefore is one of the reasons that population is a criteria for statehood 
recognition under international law45. That’s been said, the characteristics of being stable and 
being social & cultural rights-insensitive makes population a dubious element in the calculation 
for the test on social and cultural rights’ impact on economy. The constant status of population is 
not an effective reflection of the respect of social and cultural rights. Yet, such a concern can be 
ameliorated by using the GDP per capita growth rate, since the problematic effects of population 
will be diminished due to the calculation. Although there are inconveniences and the side effects, 
the GDP per capita growth rate works better than GDP growth rate as a DV for this research 
because the economic development in this case reaches beyond just economic performance. 
Data Analysis Strategy  
Use of Fixed Effect Model  
In order to run the regression tests on the panel data through Stata, it is necessary to decide 
whether the Fixed Effect model or the Random Effect Model should be used46. Torres-Reyna 
(2007) indicated that the Fixed Effect Model is used to better probe the exclusive influence from 
IVs to DVs, in which variables fluctuate in response to the change of time. The rationale behind 
this statement is that the Fixed Effect model acknowledges the impact of time-invariant 
elements, such as gender, blood type, race, etc., to the DVs and even IVs. Yet, this model 
controls and removes effects from these time-invariant elements on the DVs, in the pursuance of 
showing the mere impact from time-variant IVs to DVs. In contrast, the Random Effect model 
intentionally allows the inclusion of effects from time-invariant elements in the belief that they 
would affect the presence of DVs.47  
                                                          
45 The declaratory theory of statehood recognition argued that entities could claim themselves as 
sovereign states once they meet the criteria including permanent population. For detail see Worster (2009) 
pp. 153.  
46 According to Park (2010), it is impossible to exert both Fixed Effect model and Random Effect model 
on the same analyzed entities because these two models are opposite to each other on the theoretical level. 
However, practically speaking, it is possible to combine these two models. See Park (2010), footnote 1.  
47 See Torres-Reyna (2007), pp. 25. 
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Applying the concept of these two models to the research question of this thesis, where the main 
focus is to see the influence of the respect for social and cultural rights on domestic economic 
developments, the Fixed Effect model is chosen and is more suitable than the Random Effect 
model. This logic of thinking also supported by Yi (2008), in which she argued that if the 
conclusion of the impact of variables only applies to the entities within the sample and will not 
be generalized to the population or the other samples, the Fixed Effect model is ideal. Otherwise, 
the Random Effect model should be chosen. It should be acknowledged that this paper does 
generalize the hypotheses and conclusion from the sample to the population, and the sample and 
population are not absolutely identical. Yet, the sample does account for almost the entire 
population and the uncovered ones  under the international law do not meet the criteria  as a 
proper entity, namely country, in this paper. For instance, the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus as a political entity is essentially functioning as a county, but has still not been officially 
recognized as a country under the international law. Therefore, due to such characteristic of 
uncovered political entities, the range of the sample equals the population to some extent, and the 
use of Fixed Effect model is justified according to Yi (2008).  
Hausman & Taylor (1981) asserts the importance and necessity of operating the Huasman test to 
practically decide the use of these two models. For the purpose of the validity of the conclusion 
of this paper and the sound justification of the use of Fixed Effect model, the Hausman test is run 
via Stata and, as the diagrams below shows, both de jure and de facto groups pass the test. 
 
Figure 1.1 De jure group: GDP growth rate as the DV 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0045
                          =       15.10
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
    cultural     -.0174459     .0126071       -.0300529        .0143676
      health       .061937     .0635692       -.0016322        .0081925
environmen~l     -.0127137    -.0358938        .0231802        .0126557
human_rights     -.0600838    -.0437897        -.016294        .0111557
                                                                              
                     FE           RE         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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Figure 1.2 De jure group: Labor productivity as the DV 
 
 
Figure 2.1 De facto group: GDP growth rate as the DV 
 
 
Figure 2.2 De facto group: Labor productivity as the DV 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0465
                          =        9.66
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
    cultural      10430.87     10952.35       -521.4809        554.5371
      health      9302.858      9497.15       -194.2923        148.3439
environmen~l      23558.58     24200.82        -642.244        244.8236
human_rights     -15233.22     -16242.4        1009.184        335.3942
                                                                              
                     FE           RE         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0828
                          =        8.25
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
    Culture2      4.45e-12    -2.25e-12        6.71e-12        2.57e-12
    Culture1     -.0089365    -.0013496       -.0075869        .0087814
      Health      .0139061     .0110916        .0028145        .0115528
 Environment      .0151809     .0045578        .0106231        .0098728
 Humanrights     -.0772689    -.0451927       -.0320761        .0134559
                                                                              
                     FE           RE         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       62.84
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
    Culture2      7.49e-07     8.23e-07       -7.35e-08               .
    Culture1     -903.9065    -831.1871       -72.71948               .
      Health      1243.772     2327.614       -1083.842               .
 Environment     -173.4298     2283.773       -2457.203        220.8227
 Humanrights     -850.4522     977.3277        -1827.78               .
                                                                              
                     FE           RE         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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The four diagrams above illustrate the result of the Hausman test. In theory, there are different 
interpretations of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test. On one side, it is hypothesized that the 
Random Effect model is more ideal than the Fixed Effect model. (Torres-Reyna 2007; Greene 
2008) Such a belief is also reflected in the Stata manual for guiding the Hausman tests. In the 
first example in this manual, it stated the original hypothesis as “…effects are adequately 
modeled by a random-effects model”.48 The wording of such a sentence implies that the Random 
Effect model is supposed to be the “default” choice. On the other side, Park (2010) specifically 
asserts that it is wrong to assume the Random Effect model as a “better” or more “consistent” 
model than the Fixed Effect model.49 Nevertheless, no matter how opposing interpretations of 
the null hypothesis of a Hausman test are, the agreement of the no correlation between effects or 
errors and the regressors are met. On the practical level, the way to determine which model to 
use based on the result on Hausman test is also unaffected. In the case of this paper, all four text 
results show that the P-values (0.0045, 0.0465, 0.0828, 0.0000) are smaller than the threshold of 
0.1. This means that the probability of committing Type I error by rejecting the null hypothesis is 
less than 10%. Thus, it is fair to reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman test and to choose the 
Fixed Effect model. However, this paper acknowledges that choosing 0.1 as the threshold for 
statistical significance is not the optimal measure. However, the author still decides to use the 
Fixed Effect model by setting 0.1 as the verge in this paper simply due to the consideration on 
convenience that the tests can still continue, but within a legitimate range.  
Control on Time & Year Effects 
As the regressions base on panel data, year is a vital dimension in all regression analyses in this 
paper, and every regression test has controlled the year effect by the i.year command on Stata. It 
is critical to control the time effect, namely year effect, in this paper, because without it the 
regression result would be full of serious errors.  
Lewis, from Dartmouth College’s Economic Department claims that the year effect should 
always be controlled as long as time-series variables are run in regression.50 His main arguments, 
accompanied with illustration of empirical exams, are that “aggregate trends” and a lack of 
                                                          
48 See Stata Manuals 13: Hausman specification test, pp. 5 
49 See Park (2010), pp. 2 
50 See Lewis (2005).  
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mechanism controlling year effect from panel regression gives rise to inaccurate correlations. 
Thus, he comes up with the conclusion that a control on year effect should be mandatory. Di 
Giovanni & Shambaugh (2008) indirectly support such an idea by controlling time effect so that 
they could examine the net impact of their IV on the DV. Moreover, they see such a control as an 
asset in their article, compared to preceding studies, which could not manage it.  
This thesis also tries to propose a new logic, in the spirit of defending its use of year effect 
control in the context of the Fixed Effect model. As mentioned above, this paper uses Fixed 
Effect model to run panel regressions. That said, all the time-invariant elements are given a value 
of 0 and are removed from the regression, since it is not this model’s interest to include their 
effects in. As a result, all variables in this model are time-sensitive to some extent. Under such 
circumstances, incidents like “aggregate trends”, sudden and exceptional crisis, etc. would easily 
affect the regression result and examiners would not be able to infer the net connection between 
the IVs and DVs. In this case, to refine Lewis’s argument, operating panel regression via the 
Fixed Effect model should especially control year effect.  
The other ‘time’ control in this paper on the operationalization level was the use of lagged effects 
through the command of l. # of years. Specifically speaking, the de jure group of IVs is 
composed of data of the signature and/or ratification on international treaties. Thus, it is 
legitimate to expect lagged effects from the signing and ratifying stage to economic performance 
as a result for several reasons. To list a few, first, the insincere motivation or the intention to sign 
and/or ratify a treaty by countries may result in lagged effects. Some countries, especially 
developing countries, in order to build up better international reputation, will sign and even ratify 
treaties without actually thinking of implementing them. This logic of thinking makes sense 
given that developing countries have been commonly criticized by others for their problems of 
pernicious contribution to the environment, violations of human rights, tarnished social welfare 
system, etc. Compared to their counterparts, namely developed countries, which enjoy relatively 
higher international reputation, developing countries have greater motivation to improve their 
standing in the world community. Signing and ratifying some international treaties would be a 
cost-effective way to do so and the reasoning for this will be provided in the second point. Also, 
some countries might not voluntarily join a treaty family but were ‘forced’ to by others or were 
because of a package deal with other countries. Thailand, for example, was pushed to develop its 
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protection of intellectual property due to the ‘peer pressure’ from its western counterparts, since 
it had a serious violation in that area of the international standard.51   
A second reason to expect that effects on economic development will delay after the signing and 
ratifying of treaties is the slow fulfillment of some international treaties due to the tolerant 
clauses in the treaties. This answers the argument of a ‘cost-effective’ choice for some 
developing countries to promote their reputation. One obvious example is the ICESCR. This 
treaty gives a large space to state parties by allowing them taking their own pace in the process 
of fulfilling the treaty duties. The wording in Part IV ICESCR allows state parties to take 
progressive steps towards realizing the treaty. Despite the responsibility to file reports 
periodically, state parties are still given much leeway in conforming to its obligations, such as 
justifying “factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfillment…”52  
Third, for technical reasons, it naturally takes time for most international treaties to actually 
come into force after signature and ratification. The time horizons in between vary according to 
specific conditions, ranging from a few years to more than a decade.53 The de facto IVs, although 
consisting of statistics happened in reality, also might have a lagged effect. For example, the 
governmental expenditure on public health would not be reflected in economic development 
instantly because it requires time to prepare, implement, etc. 
Based on various reasons, such as those mentioned above, as well as running basic panel 
regressions, this paper lags the effects from IVs in the de jure group for five periods, namely five 
years, while lags the effects from IVs in the de facto group for three periods. The logic to choose 
five-years is that a five-years plan is usually a mid-term plan for goals on national economy.54 
Borrowing this economic idea, this paper uses a five-year-lagged effect for de jure IVs. Since the 
effect of de facto IVs is expected be faster, the period of leg effect for them is reduced to three 
years. By doing the lag effect, this paper aims to achieve two goals: First, to provide a relatively 
more accurate estimation on the net impact of the IVs on the DVs, second, to present a dynamic 
                                                          
51 See Kuanpoth (2010), pp.84.  
52 See Art. 17(2) ICESCR.  
53 For example, the time span between signature/ratification and entry into force of Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was three years while that of ICESCR was 
ten years. For detail see https://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en  
54 See Five-Year Plans (n.d.) by Encyclopædia Britannica. 
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observation of the relation between IVs and DVs. First, as justified above, the effects of signing 
and ratifying treaties cannot be observed immediately sometimes on economic performance 
because both are impacted by subjective reasons, such as a country’s motivation, and objective 
reasons, such as the bureaucracy happened during treaty implementation. Without control on 
lagged effects, results would be imprecise and dubious. Second, by adding the control on lagged 
effects, such outcomes from the regression will be compared with those from basic regressions 
and the disparity representing the effects of lagged effects of IVs will easily be noticed.  
Use of Cluster Effect 
This paper clusters countries when running regressions in order to produce an unbiased Standard 
Error (SE); it is also necessary to have such a use of cluster effect. The main practical reason of 
exerting such an effect is to prevent the situation of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity from 
happening. The occurrence of them would apparently underestimate the SE of the regression. 
Peterson (2009) already challenges that many academic papers approach the SE in the wrong 
way. As a consequence, he points out that other scholars have been misled by those papers and 
have taken such erroneous ways of pairing models with particular situations for granted.55 Gow 
et al. (2010) similarly claim that measures coping with SE, such as Fama-MacBeth, have 
problems producing accurate SE for panel data variables. This paper tries not to make the same 
mistakes as others and takes the guidance of Peterson about panel data regressions. The sample 
in this thesis meets the rule that there are more countries than years. Thus, time-series variable 
here are controlled as dummies and country variables are clustered, a “common rule” to deal with 
such a situation. (Anderson & Reeb 2004, Faulkender & Petherson 2006, Gross & Souleles 2004, 
Lamont & Polk 2001, Peterson 2009, Sapienza 2004) Peterson (2009) proves that industry-
clustered SE (country-clustered in this paper) are more unbiased than other measures. 
Moreover, Peterson (2009) states that the Fixed Effect model provides unbiased SE when firm 
effect56 is permanent, while country-clustered SE is unbiased whether permanent or not. 
Therefore, country-cluster SE is still chosen in this paper, and the results of regression with such 
an effect will be compared with basic regressions results. 
                                                          
55 See Peterson (2009), pp. 451.  
56 (Fixed ) Firm effect indicates that there are unique traits in each firm or industry that can impact the 
explained variables and there is no cross-section influence on these unique traits.  
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Results 
This section presents the outcomes of the panel regression analysis by Stata. It is divided into 
two main parts as the first one being the de jure database and the second one being the de facto 
database. As there are two DVs, namely GDP per capita growth rate and Labor productivity, 
each part contains two result tables on these DVs.  
De jure database 
Table 1. 
 
GDP per capita growth rate as the DV 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic Cluster effect Cluster & Lag effect 
      
Human Rights 0.0806*** 0.0806**  
 (0.022) (0.030)  
    
Environment  -0.0355 -0.0355  
 (0.034) (0.037)  
    
Health -0.0323 -0.0323  
 (0.023) (0.028)  
    
Education & Cultural matters 0.0404* 0.0404*  
 (0.017) (0.020)  
    
L5. Human Rights   0.0514 
   (0.031) 
    
L5. Environment   -0.115** 
   (0.041) 
    
L5. Health   0.0210 
   (0.034) 
    
L5. Education & Cultural matters   0.0311 
   (0.019) 
    
_cons 0.0571*** 0.0571*** 0.0863*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) 
     
N 7652 7652 7222 
R2 0.218 0.218 0.221 
SE in parentheses    
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"  
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Before looking at the results table, first it should be made sure that this panel regression model is 
statistically significant in terms of explaining the research. Prob> F of all three models 
summarized in Table 1 is infinitely close to 0.0000.57 That means the probability that null 
hypothesis is true is almost 0, by which the null hypothesis is rejected. In other words, the panel 
regression model per se fits to the research. Moving to Table 1, the variables were run in three 
models, with the first one a basic model; the second one a country-clustered effect; the third one 
a lag effect based on the second model. In total, 7652 objects are observed in the first two 
models, while only 7222 are observed in the third, due to the lagged effects. As L5. in the first 
column indicates a five-period lagged effect, no effect of the IVs on the DV in  the first five 
years can be showed. The R2 for all three models is also provided. It should be noted that the R2 
in the above table denotes within-group R2.58 This is because the Fixed-effects model estimates 
the effects of IVs on DVs within each section (country, in this case). Therefore, only the R2 is 
needed for interpretation. R2, simply speaking, implies the coverage of the statistic model over 
the change of the DV that can be explained by the IVs. Applied to Table 1, it indicates that the 
panel regression can explain 21.8% of the changes between IVs and the DV in the first two 
models, while 22.1% of changes can be explained in the third model by the panel regression. 
Though the difference is slight, this panel regression fits the third model better since it explains 
the variety within it. The R2 here also tells that a large percent of the changes of variables cannot 
be explained by this regression, implying that there are many potential explanatory variables that 
are not considered and/or included in this regression. Based on the fact that the difference in R2 
occurs only between model 3 and model 1&2, the lagged effect is seen to positively contribute to 
the fitness between the regression and the variables. This fact also justifies the previous 
argument for choosing lagged effects.  
Looking at the main part of the Table 1, Model 1 and 2 illustrate a consistent outcome, namely 
that respect for human rights and respect for education & cultural matters are strongly correlated 
to economic development, despite a slight difference in the degree of significance to the respect 
for human rights. Model 2 indicates that with signature/ratification of all treaties under the 
                                                          
57 See the Appendix I.  
58 For all information on the R2 , see Appendix I on original regression results.  
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human rights category by a country, its GDP per capita growth rate will rise by 8.06% points, 
whereas for signature/ratification of all treaties under the education & cultural matters category, 
the GDP per capita growth rate will increase by 4.04% points. On the other hand, neither the 
environment and health categories are statistically significant. In the context of this research, the 
results show that there is no proven correlation between the impact of respect for environment 
and health treaties on economic development. Moving to model 3, the outcomes differ 
considerably from the previous two. After adding the lag effects, the statistical significance of 
human rights and education and cultural matters category disappears. That said, after five years 
of signature/ratification of these two treaties, the GDP per capita growth rate is no longer related 
to the respect of them. In contrast, environment category comes to show a moderate significance 
on the regression. However, such a correlation exists negatively between respect for environment 
rights and the GDP per capita growth. This outcome suggests that with signature/ratification on 
all treaties by a country under the environment treaty category, its GDP per capita growth rate 
will decrease by 11.5% points. The standard errors of each IV are displayed as the parentheses in 
this table. All coefficients have smaller standard errors compared with their statistical 
significance. This means that the estimates of these coefficients are greatly accurate.  
 
Result on Labor productivity 
Table 2. 
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In this regression, the Prob>F for all three models is infinitely approaching 0.0000,59 showing 
that this regression model is fitting the research. There are 5909 objects in the first two models 
and 5408 in the third, due to the lag effects. The within-group R2 of this table shows that, as to 
                                                          
59 See Appendix II.  
Labor Productivity as the DV 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic Cluster effect Cluster & Lag effect  
      
Human Rights 29435.5*** 29435.5   
 (6660.095) (28991.26)  
    
Environment 89660.0*** 89660.0*  
 (10719.01) (38175.37)  
    
Health 7857.0 7857.0  
 (6667.629) (8818.879)  
    
Education & Cultural matters 15592.3*** 15592.3  
 (4700.402) (16901.6)  
    
L5. Human Rights   34907.1 
   (24092.77) 
    
L5. Environment   93518.0* 
   (36913.21) 
    
L5. Health   7700.4 
   (7999.325) 
    
L5. Education & Cultural matters   11995.6 
   (15038.76) 
    
_cons 40629.5*** 40629.5*** 47325.0*** 
 (3842.757) (6744.454) (8557.168) 
       
N 5909 5909 5408 
R2 0.039 0.039 0.046 
SE in parentheses     
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"  
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the first two models, only a 3.9% change in Labor productivity could be explained, while 4.6% 
of the changes to the DV can be covered by the third model. This implies that, compared to the 
regression model on the last DV, there are more potential explanatory variables that have been 
left out of this regression model. That said, this panel regression model works better when 
explaining the GDP per capita growth rate than the Labor productivity.  
As to the main part, model 1 shows that a majority of IVs significantly correlate to Labor 
productivity; the number largely decreases in the next two models, with only one statistically 
significant correlation in each. Specifically speaking, as in model 1, signature/ratification on all 
human rights category treaties of a country brings an increase of 29435.5 dollars in its labor 
productivity per person annually; signature/ratification on all environmental treaties raises 89660 
dollars in the country’s labor productivity; signature/ratification on all treaties under the 
education and cultural matters category by a country increases such a DV by 15592.3 dollars.  
In the second model, after clustering countries, only the environment treaty group remains a 
correlation with the growth in labor productivity at a significant level. Obviously, the cluster 
effect causes the disappearance of the significance of human rights and education & cultural 
matters categories. The result in the third model is the same as the second. After being lagged for 
five years, the environment category still affects labor productivity, with even greater magnitude. 
With signature/ratification of all the environmental treaties by a country, labor productivity per 
person each year increases by 93518 dollars. The increase in R2 from model 1 and 2 to 3 again 
suggests a positive impact from the use of lagged effect to the degree of fitness of the regression 
model. The lagged effects of IVs in this regression have no major influence on the result, since 
the significance stays the same (recall that in the last table it changed drastically). This means not 
that there is no lagged effect because the coefficients of all treaty categories have changed, but 
that the changes are not great enough to be reflected at the significant level in general. It should 
be noted that the environment treaty category significantly contributes positively to labor 
productivity in all models in this regression model. Therefore, it is safe to say that respect 
specifically for environment treaties or environmental rights contributes to the economic 
performance in the form of labor productivity. Again, all standard errors under the coefficients 
with significance are smaller than the coefficients, indicating the precise prediction of this 
regression model.  
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De facto database 
Result on GDP per capita growth rate  
Table 3.  
 
The result of Prob >F in this section is abnormal. It can be seen from the Appendix III that model 
1’s result is close  to 0.000 as usual, while the other two models’ Prob >F is missing. The most 
GDP per capita growth rate as the DV 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic  
Cluster 
effect  
Cluster 
& Lag 
effect 
    
Human Rights -0.0103 -0.0103  
 (0.016) (0.016)  
    
Environment 0.00777 0.00777  
 (0.008) (0.006)  
    
Health -0.0122 -0.0122  
 (0.010) (0.016)  
    
Education & Cultural matters 
-3.14e-
12 
-3.14e-
12  
 (5.58e) (3.45e)  
    
L3. Human Rights   0.00995 
   (0.015) 
    
L3. Environment   -0.0169* 
   (0.008) 
    
L3. Health   
-
0.0322** 
   (0.012) 
    
L3. Education & Cultural matters   
-4.35e-
12 
   (3.19e) 
    
_cons 0.173*** 0.173** 0.171** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.059) 
    
N 634 634 636 
R2 0.362 0.362 0.259 
SE in parentheses    
="* p<0.05 
 ** 
p<0.01 
 *** 
p<0.001"  
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possible explanation of this is that there are too many clustered groups, considering the total 
number of cases observed. As the Appendix III shows, there are 120 country clusters, while the 
number of observed cases is 634 for model 2 and 636 for model 3. The author does not see this 
as a crucial problem because model 1 proves that this regression model  still fit the research 
design. The disappearance of the Prob >F and F values accord with the disproportionate cluster-
total observed cases ratio, which to some extent testifies to the reliability of this regression 
model.  
Moving to the R2 statistics, the coverage of this regression model over the changes of GDP per 
capita growth rate is better than the de jure part. Model 1 and 2 present an explanatory radiation 
of 36.2%, while the third model shows 25.9%, which is still much higher than the corresponding 
model in the de jure GDP per capita growth rate. This phenomenon testifies that the explanatory 
capability of IVs in the de facto database is better in this model than that of IVs in the de jure 
database. Yet, it still present the existence of a large percent of hidden explanatory variables that 
are capable of affecting the DVs.  
The results of the main part of Table 3 provide totally different outcomes to those of the de jure 
part. First, as to model 1 and 2, for both DVs in the de jure part, there is at least one IV that is 
significantly correlated to the DV on a significant level. Yet, Table 3 shows that all IVs in model 
1 and 2 have no statistical significance, implying that there is no correlation between the IVs and 
the GDP per capita growth rate. It is notable that this result confirms that, even considering the 
country cluster effect, non-significance still occurred in this table. This implies that potential 
issues, such as heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations, did not impact the regression result; no 
matter whether they were controlled, the results on significance remain the same somewhat 
solidifying the thought that there is no correlation between IVs and the DV. Second, all IVs that 
are significantly affecting the performance of DVs in the de jure part demonstrate a positive 
relationship. Nevertheless, the only two correlations in this table, which both appear in model 3 
with a three-period lagged effect, display negative relationships. Specifically speaking, with 
every unit increase in respect for the environmental rights (in the form of reducing the CO2 
emissions per metrics) the GDP per capita growth rate is expected to decrease by 1.69% points 
after three years. Also, every one more point in the form of governmental expenditure on public 
health to GDP ratio in a country, its GDP per capita growth will decline by 3.22% points three 
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years later. In sum, statistics results in Table 3 reveal that respect for social and cultural rights do 
not contribute to the growth in GDP per capita immediately while respect for environmental and 
health rights will hamper the economic development after a couple of years. The standard errors 
under the statistically significant variables imply that the estimates could be precise when 
generating to the population.   
Result on Labor productivity 
Table 4.  
 
Table 4 shows the regression results of the influence of de facto respect for social and cultural 
rights on labor productivity as a representation for economic development. Statistics on Prob > F 
Labor productivity as the DV 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic 
Cluster 
effect  
Cluster & 
Lag effect  
    
Human Rights 785.1 785.1  
 (525.782) (563.777)  
    
Environment -836.3** -836.3  
 (271.010) (1428.797)  
    
Health -608.7 -608.7  
 (331.077) (640.689)  
    
Education & Cultural matters 0.000000639*** 0.000000639  
 (1.78e) (4.36e)  
    
L3. Human Rights   761.7 
   (-608.777) 
    
L3. Environment   -1278.0 
   (1395.975) 
    
L3. Health   -547.1 
   (582.924) 
    
L3. Education & Cultural matters   0.000000410 
   (3.79e) 
    
_cons 38933.3*** 38933.3*** 44230.4*** 
 (1770.996) (6566.666) (6619.949) 
    
N 532 532 532 
R2 0.549 0.549 0.518 
SE in parentheses    
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
 *** 
p<0.001"  
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in all three models are infinitely approaching but never reaching 0.000.60 This indicates a good 
match between this panel regression model and the research design. Overall, 532 cases are 
observed from each model. It is outstanding, compared to all three tables above, that all models 
in this regression have an R2 above 0.5. This means they are all be able to explain more than 
50% in the fluctuations in the labor productivity of each model. According to the performance of 
other regression models analyzed above, this is the strongest figure in terms of R2. The basic 
model presents two significant IVs: respect for environmental rights and respect for education 
and cultural rights. The former shows the negative correlation between this IV and labor 
productivity on a moderate significant level (0.01). It indicates that every metric of increase in 
CO2 emission gives rise to an 836.3 dollar decline in labor productivity per person per year, and 
the probability of this to not happen could be less than 1%. The latter, respect for education and 
cultural rights, meanwhile, reveals a positive correlation with labor productivity, with limited 
effects on the DV. For every point increase of governmental expenditure on education-GDP ratio 
and one more dollar spent on the use of Intellectual Property (IP), labor productivity will raise 
merely 0.0000639 dollars per person annually. Moving to the results from model 2 and 3, besides 
the consistence of the insignificant IVs in model 1, also to be noted is that these two originally 
significant IVs also lose their insignificance. In sum, this implies that for respect for 
environmental and education & cultural rights, first, heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation are 
potential issues, which after being fixed by country cluster, lead to the insignificance, and ; 
second, that respect for these two categories of rights might only affect labor productivity 
immediately and have no lagged effects. Last, standard errors under the significant variables is 
smaller than them, indicating a nice potential of generality.  
Summary 
To summarize, the regression results indicate that both de jure and de facto respects for 
environmental rights basically negatively impact, with hysteresis, on the GDP per capita growth 
rate as a representation of the economic development. Besides the influence of the above rights, 
respect for human rights in general, education & cultural rights, and health rights also contribute 
to the fluctuation of this type of economic development. On one side, the de jure respect for  the 
human rights category and education & cultural rights specifically positively impact this kind of 
                                                          
60 See Appendix IV.  
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economic development, without lagged effects. On the other side, de facto respect for health 
rights, though displaying no instant impact, belatedly and negatively influences economic 
development. 
As to the effects on labor productivity per person as the representation of economic 
development, the de jure and de facto respects for environmental rights give wholly opposite 
results. The de jure respect for this type of right positively contributes to economic development, 
with both instant and lagged effects. In contrast, de facto respect for environmental rights shows 
a negative impact on economic development, yet only in the basic model. This implies that its 
influence might suffer heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation issues and has no hysteresis. Besides 
that, respect for education & cultural rights might have positive affect on the economic 
development since both de jure and de facto respects for such rights are significant in model 1. 
However, neither of them passed the country cluster test, which implies a strong potential 
heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation problem. In addition, de jure respect for human rights in 
general also positively contributes to this type of economic development, yet with a failure in the 
country cluster effects test.  
The table below provides a brief illustration on the impact of both de jure and de facto respects 
for all categories of rights on the economic development 
 
The author recognizes a positive or negative effect of a certain IV to the DV as long as one 
outcome of this IV among the three models shows a positive or negative effect with statistical 
 De jure database De facto database 
GDP per capita 
growth rate 
Labor productivity GDP per capita 
growth rate 
Labor productivity 
Respect for 
human rights 
Positive effects Positive effects No effect No effect 
Respect for 
environmental 
rights 
Negative effects Positive effects Negative effects Negative effects 
Respect for 
health rights 
No effect No effect Negative effects No effect 
Respect for 
education & 
cultural rights 
Positive effects Positive effects No effect Positive effects 
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significance. For example, de jure respect for human rights shows positive impacts on GDP per 
capita growth rate with significance only in model 1and 2, but not in model 3. It is still regarded 
as having positive impact on the DV.  
In chapter 3, two main parts will be displayed with one discussing the regression results and the 
other concluding this research paper. The first one, discussion part, mainly explain the statistic 
outcomes and the implication of such outcomes to the research. Actually impacts of different 
models and effects applied in the tests to the research question are demonstrated. This part also 
reflects the test outcomes back the theories referred in chapter 1 and admits certain limitations of 
the tests. The second part, conclusion, starts with a discussion around the hypotheses based on 
the regression results and ends up with suggestions to further studies.   
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Chapter Three 
Discussion 
 
Chapter Three provides discussion and analyses of the results of the regressions illustrated above 
and will be divided into three parts. The first part elaborates on the discussion of these abnormal 
and outstanding statistics results. The second part provides the author’s thoughts on the reflection 
of the test results to the theory discussed earlier in the theoretical framework section. The third 
part brings up limitations and loopholes of the research design and this panel regression, and 
reflects on directions for future research. 
Part I Discussion on test results 
It is noticeable that in all four regression tests, the R2 is relatively small, with the largest being 
0.549 and the smallest being 0.039. It was argued that any model with an R2 smaller than 0.7 is 
not functional.61 This paper argues that R2 is a vital index to see the coverage of the model for 
the explanation of the fluctuation of DVs. Yet, a small R2 does not imply the poor explanatory 
quality of this model. In the context of the research topic, although the research focused on the 
contribution of the respect for social and cultural rights on economic development, it is self-
evident that human rights are neither the only explanatory variables nor even the major ones 
when checking economic performance. Thus, it is appreciable that the coverage of the regression 
model would not include the major explanatory variables affecting economic development. 
However, this does not discredit the precision of the estimate of model of the respect for social 
and cultural rights particularly. Such situations are not uncommon; there are cases that model 
with R2 at 0.04 which produce a workable model in terms of the predicting ability on its IVs and 
DVs.62  
It is also apparent that country cluster effects turn some originally significant statistics into 
insignificant ones. Cluster effects usually are employed to fix the problem of a violation of the 
classical assumption that entities within a group are unique and independent, in order to secure a 
stronger SE result.63 The violation of the classical assumption could be the result of the 
                                                          
61 See Martin (2012).  
62 Ibid.  
63 See Nichols & Schaffer (2007). 
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occurrence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation mentioned in the last section, with the 
former pertinent to the violation of the feature of entities and the latter related to time effects. 
Either one might happen in the context of this research. Autocorrelation can be seen, for 
instance, in the euro crisis, where many EU members’ economic development have greatly 
slowed for a while, causing disturbances correlating to each other in a time series, violating the 
classical assumption. Heteroscedasticity, meanwhile, mostly occurs under two conditions: first, 
under the lack of certain explanatory variables; second, under extreme situations like war, crises, 
etc. According to the small R2, it is reasonable that some non-included variables would create 
different impacts on different countries. Due to the use of the cluster effect together with time 
control, all these potential issues were fixed.  
As to those IVs that negatively contribute to economic development, analysis is given in the 
following order. For the de jure part, the respect for environmental rights in model 3 is the only 
IV that significantly shows a negative influence on economic development, represented by GDP 
per capita growth rate. The composition of this category of rights is large, with nine 
environmental treaties as indicators. Yet, regression run specifically on this treaty group shows 
that no treaty by itself is proven negatively impacting economic development.64 Among these 
nine indicators, five of them show statistical insignificance, regarding effects on GDP per capita 
growth rate. The other four have no results observed. Thus, the outcome that de jure respect for 
environmental rights hampers the economic development actually cannot be explained 
respectively by each treaty under this treaty category. For the de facto part, the respect for 
environmental rights again hinders economic development, represented by both DVs. Since de 
facto environmental rights has only one indicator, namely CO2 emission per metric, it is easy to 
understand such a result. Applying this result to the context of developing countries, CO2 
emission is closely related to industrial development, so that the emissions of developing 
countries will be artificially much higher than that of developed countries.65 It is also known that 
most developing countries lack the capability to supplying vast renewable energies. Thus, 
following this logic, if CO2 emission is treated as a respect for environmental rights, the 
industrial productivity, which heavily relies on the it, shrinks. Such shrinking of the industry and 
                                                          
64 See Appendix V.  
65 See Volcovici (2013).  
48 
 
slow-down in the market will doubtless be reflected in all GDP-related economic indexes, 
including the two DVs selected in this thesis.   
In the de facto group, respect for health rights, represented by government expenditure on public 
health, also diminishes economic development in the form of lagged GDP per capita growth rate. 
One possible justification for this could be that more expenditure on public health improves other 
metrics,  such as mortality and life expectancy. Thus, the population sizes of countries, which 
serves as the denominator in the GDP per capita calculation, enlarge. As a result, the GDP per 
capita growth rate showed a mathematical decrease when expenditure on public health grows. 
Such logic is theoretically possible. Farahani M. et al. (2010) proved that there is a positive 
correlation between spending on public health and the control of death rate in India.66 Although 
this empirical result is from the case study of a single country, it still partially buttresses the 
reasoning above since the possibility of the argument is proven to exist.  
Part II Reflection on theory 
The regression results to some extent reflect the arguments referred to in chapter 1  of scholars in 
this field with opposite thoughts. Jones (2005)’s argument that rights-based development is 
nothing less than the reading of documents can be partly verified by comparing the outcomes of 
de jure and de facto databases. If the de facto outcomes are no worse or are even better than the 
de jure outcomes, Jones’ argument can be proved right. Comprehensively, Jones’ argument is 
undermined by the result that the negative contribution of IVs and non-correlated relationships 
can be found more in the de jure database than in the de facto database. This means that 
countries may be leaning more to the side of the ‘mere reading of documents’ than to the side of 
taking practical actions to fulfill their legal obligation. The statements of Uvin (2002), that the 
rights-based approach could be nothing more than rhetoric, were enhanced by the result.  
Yet, the superficial failure of Jones’ theory (2005) and success of Uvin’s (2002) can be rejected 
by the following arguments. The worse performance of de facto respect for social and cultural 
rights than de jure ones does not necessarily mean that countries are purely ‘reading documents’. 
The outcomes of tests on de jure respect per se can prove actions taken by countries. Simple 
signatures and ratification do not automatically arouse better economic development if no 
                                                          
66 Farahani M. et al. (2010) in their Abstract suggested that every 10% increase in the spending on public 
health leads to 2% decrease in the probability of death rate.  
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specific course of actions is carried out. The statistically significant positive correlations between 
IVs and DVs in the de jure part itself could reflect the efforts made by countries. Since the 
ICESCR allows countries to take progressive approach to achieve its goals, it is understandable 
that outcomes from the de facto part might be worse than that from the de jure part, since 
practical actions take time and won’t be reflected immediately.  
The regression outcomes of the de jure database also buttress Hausermann (1988)’s arguments. 
He claims that, when playing a role in development studies, human-rights approaches find their 
ground in international law. Though not all, many outcomes in the de jure part show a positive 
correlation between IVs and DVs, especially the effects on labor productivity. Such results might 
not be able to prove that international law can secure the role of all rights in the context of 
development studies, but the effects of international law on human rights development discourse, 
in the form of treaties, is evident.  
Regression results vary largely with the manipulation of different models, DVs, and types of IVs, 
which seemingly weaken the influence of respect for social and cultural rights on economic 
development. Yet, appearance of some positive correlations between them presented that the 
function as normative guidance of social and cultural rights, proposed by Cornwall & Nyamu-
Musembi (2004), cannot be denied just because of the fluctuation of their effects.  
Part III Limitations of the research 
It is acknowledged that the tests within this thesis face limitations and constraints. Some of these 
are unavoidable but trigger deliberate thoughts for future studies. Below, some main limits 
concerned in this paper are discussed.  
First, due to practical concerns, the research design and the variables selected imply 
imperfections in the regressions. This paper tries to include as many elements as possible to 
represent each group of specific rights. However, it is impossible to include all areas of a 
category of rights, maybe even not all major ones. For example, during the de jure IV selection, 
even though several treaties were chosen under each category, some important ones were not 
able to be included. Some of them disqualify the legal basis of this paper, namely the ICESCR, 
in terms of their birth years, while others lack enough data to meet the criteria. Even for the 
selected indicators, many of them had incomplete data. For instance, when the de jure database 
was established, the scarcity of data in the environment and cultural treaty categories caused the 
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occurrence of insufficient observations in the trial regression test. In order to have enough cases 
for observation, the missing data, originally left blank in cells, was coded as 0, being treated as 
being neither signifying nor ratifying treaties. Although objectively speaking, the missing of data 
equals not signifying/ratifying, there is a difference from the perspective of countries’ attitudes to 
the treaties between them not captured by the 0 value.  
There also could be controversies from the use of the Fixed Effect model, even though both 
theoretical arguments and the Hausman test point out the Fixed Effect model as the ideal choice 
for this research. Bell & Jones (2015) claim that even when a Hausman test shows a result in 
favor of using the Fixed Effect model, it nevertheless proves misleading.67 They argue that the 
Fixed Effect model is disadvantaged by “correlating lower-level covariates and higher-level 
residuals”, which removes many beneficial explanatory variables in the model.68 
Second, as mentioned and explained in the Data collection part and Data preparation part, the 
choice of human rights treaty categories in the de jure database is problematic, yet inevitable. 
The main flaw is that treaties selected under this category contain elements beyond the scope of 
this research, which includes only social and cultural rights. Although it is argued that the use of 
other right categories containing only social and cultural rights indicators in the de jure part, 
combined with the use of de facto IVs reflecting only respect for social and cultural rights 
reduces the problem created by the human rights treaty group, it does not comprehensively solve 
this flaw.  
Unsurprisingly, the de jure respect for human rights treaties did not perform well with regard to 
the appearance on its significant contribution to economic development. It is shown to positively 
contribute to GDP per capita growth rate in model 1 & 2, and to labor productivity in model 1 
with statistical significance. However, even these already unsatisfying results can be weakened 
by further detailed analysis, followed by proper logical reasoning: Appendix VI shows that 
respect for the human rights treaties positively correlated to both DVs with statistics significance 
in most cases. However, it is impossible to tell what convinced countries to sign/ratify treaties 
(e.g. for the sake of social rights, cultural rights, economic rights, a combination of these?) in the 
                                                          
67 See Bell & Jones (2015), pp.148. 
68 See Bell & Jones (2015), pp. 133. 
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regression model. Also, the treaty against discrimination on women (CEDAW 1979) displayed 
the same regression result for both DVs as the ICESCR did. Yet, it is insurmountable to discern 
why countries sign/ratify it. (e.g. for the sake of women’s political and civil rights, for their 
social and cultural rights, for all these?)  
Third, these selected IVs also obtained disadvantages that would harm the accuracy of the result. 
First, as to the treaties selected as indicators in the de jure part, they cannot precisely reflect 
countries’ attitude towards human rights. As acknowledges above, some treaties are not chosen 
because they had existed before the birth of ICESCR. Yet, countries might have signed and/or 
ratified those non-selected treaties as their respect for relative rights, which is not measured in 
this paper. Following the same logic, it can be said that for treaties in the de jure part that 
countries did not sign or ratified, unrespect for such rights of these countries cannot be declared 
since they could have showed it in other treaties beyond the range of this research. Second, as to 
the de facto indicators, the same logic discussed in the first part also applies. For example, this 
paper only uses CO2 emission per metric to represent for respect for environmental rights. Yet, 
several other indicators, such as PM2.5 air pollution and renewable energy consumption69, 
measures attitudes towards environmental rights of countries as well. For those which perform 
unsatisfactorily on the CO2 emission per metric could score higher than other potential 
indicators.   
Last but not the least, the regressions at most can only prove the existence of correlations 
between respect for social and cultural rights and the economic development in certain 
conditions. For example, more de jure respect for environmental rights, as a representation of 
social rights, of a country is proven to arouse certain increase in its labor productivity. Yet, this 
only shows the correlation that change in this IV is expected have a large chance to predict the 
change in this DV. It is impossible to claim that the change of the DV is caused by the IV 
because some other variables not included in the model might also have the same impact on the 
change of DV. Therefore, the causality cannot be presented by using this method.   
                                                          
69See The World Bank. Data by Indicators: Environment.  
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Conclusion 
The regression results answered the two hypotheses to various extents. The first hypothesis, 
claiming a positive contribution from the respect for social and cultural rights and the economic 
development, was ambiguously answered by the test results. Because three different models were 
applied in the regression, their various and even opposing outcomes make it difficult to 
definitively confirm or deny this hypothesis. Generally speaking, the majority of the explanatory 
variables, except respect for health rights, confirmed the first hypothesis that positive 
correlations between IVs and DVs exist. Yet, the question of how strong and how consistent 
these correlations are cannot be answered within the limited focus of this research.  
With regard to the second hypothesis, it is more apparent that this hypothesis is essentially, 
though not absolutely, true. Most outcomes of the regression support the hypothesis by showing 
discrete results of the two databases. Two differences between the respect to de jure rights and to 
the de facto rights were observed. The first is the disparity between the positivity and negativity 
of the contribution of the IVs. Effects on labor productivity, for instance, showed a positive 
influence of the de jure respect for environmental rights, yet a negative impact of the de facto 
part respect. The second is the disparity among tests of statistical significances. For example, de 
jure respect for the human rights category has a positive correlation with the economic 
development, while the de facto respect for it proved irrelevant. Thus, it can be declared that 
there is a different contribution to the DVs between de jure respect and de facto respect.  
In addition, one common problem for the response to both hypotheses is that the regression 
cannot comprehend the specific conditions in different regions. The outcome that de jure respect 
for environmental rights positively correlates to growth in labor productivity might not be a one-
for-all result. It might work in one region but not to another.  
Regardless of the results, this paper presents an innovative attempt at picturing the relationship 
between second generation human rights and development that is rarely paid attention. As a 
pioneer of such a research realm, this paper cannot avoid disadvantages from various 
perspectives. Technological issues, from hypothesis building to regression implementation, 
might affect the reliability and validity of the results of this paper. Yet, this research does not 
expect to produce an absolutely black and white answer to its research question. The purpose of 
initiating this research is to set up an empirical foundation for further studies, including receiving 
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criticisms and doubts. Further studies in this field could build upon this paper by improving two 
points.  
First, they could look into specific situations, by dividing countries into regions and conducting a 
comparison. This would produce a more accurate observation, including more explanatory 
variables, as the respect for rights vastly vary in regions. Scholars could, for instance, choose the 
same IVs and DVs, to run regressions on EU members and ASEAN70 members separately and 
compare the results of these two groups. The foreseeable advantage is that test result of one 
group is based on countries with more or less the similar ideologies and political agenda. Their 
agendas to some extent are guided by the unified transnational organization, namely EU or 
ASEAN. Therefore, with regard to human rights issues, they should have larger ground of 
consensus than non-organization members. Test results under such circumstances, would be 
more accurate to reflect the reality due to the a smaller sample for each regression and similar 
conditions of political basis.  
Second, they could take a qualitative methodology, such as single-case studies or small-N 
comparison studies, to explore the particular relationship between IVs and DVs in one country or 
small groups of comparable countries. As observed in the result section and recognized in the 
part I of discussion section, the low coverage is a concern for this paper when it comes to the 
results interpretation. By taking a qualitative research method based on this paper, the problem of 
lacking enough coverage could be solve because such methods look into the details of each case. 
That’s been said, other factors that play more important roles in affecting economic development 
would be considered and perhaps explained, besides studying the impact of respect for social and 
cultural rights on development. Moreover, the qualitative methods could also provide clear 
answers and justifications of reasons countries chose one specific ways to show their respect for 
human rights that method in this paper cannot. Building up on the result of this paper, future 
studies by qualitative methods could inquire why, for instance, Afghanistan ratified the ICESCR 
but has not even signed the International Convention against Apartheid in Sports yet? Or what 
made this country decide to ratify the CEDAW from its signing status?  
                                                          
70 ASEAN denotes to Association of Southeast Asian Nations.  
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Methods suggested in the last paragraph can be combined with the first point of dividing 
countries into certain groups for tests and the combination would work better than each of these 
two. By conducting the first one of reducing the sample for regression, aiming to improve the 
coverage and the accuracy of the regression result at a systematic level, the second one assist to 
provide specific interpretations according to the unique conditions of each research subject.  
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Appendix 
I. Raw regression results of all three models in Table 1 
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Model 3 of Table 1 
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II. Raw regression results of all three models in Table 2 
Model 1 of Table 2 
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Model 3 of Table 2 
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III. Raw regression results of all three models in Table 3 
Model 1 of Table 3 
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Model 3 of Table 3 
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IV. Raw regression results of all three models in Table 4 
Model 1 of Table 4 
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V. Detailed regression result of de jure respect for environmental rights to GDP per 
capita growth rate in model 3  
 
 
De jure respect to Environment rights to GDP per capita growth 
rate  
 (1)  
 gdp_growth_rate  
   
L5.UNFCCC1992 -0.0362  
 (-1.15)  
   
L5.KyotoProtocoltoUNFCC1997 -0.0119  
 (-1.15)  
   
L5.AMTtoAnnexBofKyotoProtocol -0.0232  
 (-1.46)  
   
oL5.DohaAMTtoKyotoProtocol2012 0  
 (.)  
   
oL5.ParisAgreement2015 0  
 (.)  
   
L5.CBDbiodiversity1992 0.0320  
 (1.25)  
   
L5.CartegenaProtocolonBiosafety -0.0131  
 (-1.26)  
   
oL5.NagoyaProtocoltoCBD2010 0  
 (.)  
   
oL5.NagoyaKualaLumpurProtocol201 0  
 (.)  
   
_cons 0.0853***  
 (10.61)  
   
N 7222  
t statistics in parentheses   
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
 *** 
p<0.001" 
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VI. Detailed results of respect for human rights treaty group as de jure IV 
 
Detailed results of respect to Human Rights group  as de jure IV 
 (1) (2) 
 
GDP per capita growth 
rate 
Labor 
Productivity 
   
ICESCR1966 0.0276*** 7923.7*** 
 (3.61) (3.91) 
   
OptionalProtocoltoICESCR2008 -0.0118 3037.4 
 (-0.66) (0.66) 
   
CEDAW1979 0.0202* 18260.3*** 
 (2.08) (7.48) 
   
OptionalProtocoltoCEDAW1999 -0.00910 18456.4*** 
 (-1.00) (7.92) 
   
CRCchild1989 -0.00985 6107.4 
 (-0.53) (1.42) 
   
OptionalProtocoltoCRCarmed 0.00978 6540.0* 
 (1.03) (2.10) 
   
CRPDdisabled2006 0.00151 -3835.4 
 (0.13) (-0.91) 
   
CASaparteidsport1985 0.0249** -24652.0*** 
 (2.92) (-11.53) 
   
_cons 0.0564*** 40064.7*** 
 (5.77) (10.60) 
   
N 7652 5909 
t statistics in parentheses   
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
 
